Legally Insane or Guilty but Mentally Ill: A Suggested Jury Instruction by Murphy, Arthur A.
Volume 88 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 88, 
1983-1984 
1-1-1984 
Legally Insane or Guilty but Mentally Ill: A Suggested Jury 
Instruction 
Arthur A. Murphy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Arthur A. Murphy, Legally Insane or Guilty but Mentally Ill: A Suggested Jury Instruction, 88 DICK. L. REV. 
344 (1984). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol88/iss2/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Legally Insane or Guilty but Mentally Ill:
A Suggested Jury Instruction
Arthur A. Murphy*
About a year ago, the Pennsylvania Legislature made some ad-
justments in the insanity defense. Act No. 2861 authorizes verdicts
of "guilty but mentally ill" in criminal trials when an insanity de-
fense is asserted but something short of legal insanity is proved.
Persons found "guilty but mentally ill" are both sentenced for their
crimes and considered for possible therapeutic treatment.$ Act No.
286 also confirms M'Naghten's Rule as the sole test for legal in-
sanity 4 and returns the burden of proving insanity to the defendant.5
A verdict of "not guilty by reason of legal insanity" may trig-
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law; B.S. 1946, United States Military
Academy, West Point; L.L.B. 1952, Harvard Law School.
1. Act of Dec. 15, 1982, P.L. 1262, No. 286. The Act added new Sections 314 and 315
to Title 18, PA. CONS. STAT. (the Crimes Code) and new Section 9727 to Title 42, PA. CONS.
STAT. (the Judicial Code).
2. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §314(a)(1983). A "mentally ill" person is defined as one who at
the time of the crime "as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §314(c)(1)(1983).
3. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §9727(a)(Supp. 1983).
4. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §315(1983) (Insanity) provides:
(a) General rule - The mental soundness of an actor engaged in conduct
charged to constitute an offense shall only be a defense to a charged offense
when the actor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the actor was
legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
(b) Definition - For purposes of this section, the phrase "legally insane"
means that, at the time of the commission of the offense, the actor was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if the actor did know the quality
of the act, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §314(d)(1983) expressly preserves "the common law defense of insanity
(M'naghten's Rule)."
These provisions should lay to rest the defense of "homicidal mania" or "moral insanity,"
a kind of irresistible impulse supplement to M'Naghten, which was cautiously advanced in
Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846), the benchmark case on the insanity defense. The
doctrine never had much practical significance and had become moribund. See Comment,
Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Reasonable Compromise for Pennsylvania, 85 Dick. L. Rev. 289,
295-97 (1981); W. TRICKETT, THE LAW OF CRIMES IN PENNSYLVANIA 1099-1111 (1908).
5. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 321
A.2d 627 (1974), relieved the defendant of the traditional burden of persuasion on the insanity
defense. After Demmitt, whenever the issue of insanity was raised by the evidence, the Com-
monwealth had the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
ger, while a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" will trigger, proceed-
ings under the Mental Health Procedures Act.6 The court, after a
hearing, determines whether the defendant is severely mentally dis-
abled and in need of treatment at that present time. The defendant's
potential dangerousness to other persons is highly relevant to this
determination.7 When a person has been acquitted on the ground of
legal insanity, the proceedings may result in an involuntary civil
commitment to a mental health facility.' In the case of an individual
found guilty but mentally ill, the process may lead to involuntary
treatment of the convict in a prison or in a hospital setting.9 The
Mental Health Procedures Act also covers persons with mental
problems who are convicted under ordinary verdicts. The Act pro-
vides for their treatment, including involuntary treatment, in mental
institutions and for transfers between prisons and hospitals.10
The author, as reporter to the criminal instructions subcommit-
tee of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Committee for Proposed
Standard Jury Instructions, recently drafted an insanity instruction
that incorporates changes wrought by Act No. 286. The instruction
has been approved by the subcommittee and eventually will be added
to the Committee's manual of suggested criminal charges." This ar-
ticle makes the instruction available sooner than it would be
otherwise.
One of the purposes in writing this article is to invite comment
on the new insanity charge. Jury instructions are blue collar law.
They are the tools and templates with which jurors work the raw
material of the facts in their effort to fashion results that conform to
law and do justice. Jury instructions must be true to the law as ex-
pressed in statutes and appellate decisions, yet manageable by lay-
men. The design of a good insanity charge is especially difficult be-
cause of the complexities inherent in legal concepts of mental
responsibility, in medical-scientific concepts of mental disorder and
6. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, No. 143, codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§7101-
7503 (Purdon Supp. 1983). Following an insanity acquittal, any responsible party, including
the Commonwealth's attorney, acting on his own initiative or at the court's direction, may
petition the court for an involuntary treatment order. Id. §§ 7304(c)(1), 7406. After a verdict
of guilty but mentally ill, the court is required to consider the appropriateness of involuntary
treatment. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. §9727(a)(Supp. 1983).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §7301 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
8. Id. §7304(a)(1).
9. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §9727(b)(1)(Supp. 1983).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§7401(a)(b), 7405-7407(Purdon Supp. 1983). For a
description of the Mental Health Procedures Act and its operation in criminal cases, see M.H.
Belsky, Pennsylvania's New Mental Health Law, 48 PA. BAR. Q. 482 (1977) (caveat: article
antedates amendments made by the Act of Nov. 26, 1978, P.L. 1362, No. 324).
11. Criminal Instructions Subcommittee on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee
for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions, Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instruc-
tions-Criminal (1979). This manual and its periodic supplements are published by the Penn-
sylvania Bar Institute.
in relating one to the other. More so than most instructions, a good
insanity charge is aptly characterized as a tool, not a template. It
equips the jurors with the proper implement for approaching their
task, rather than with a gauge for mechanically sorting out the in-
sane. The author and the subcommittee welcome ideas for improving
their handiwork.
.Taken together, Pennsylvania's M'Naghten defense-with the
burden of persuasion on the defendant, the new category of guilty
but mentally ill, and the dispositional alternatives offered by the
Mental Health Procedures Act provide a fair and sensible legal
framework for dealing with the intractable questions of who should
be held mentally accountable for "criminal" conduct and what
should be done with individuals who are not accountable. 12 The only
change the author recommends at this time is in the standard for a
finding of guilty but mentally ill. Act No. 286 requires that the trier
of fact find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime and was not legally insane, but, as a result of mental dis-
ease or defect, lacked "substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law."18 The legislature should modify these criteria to
reduce the degree of proof needed and to simplify the definition of
"mentally ill." For example, the verdict of guilty but mentally ill
might be made to require, in addition to a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant "although not legally insane, was at the time of the
crime substantially affected by a mental disease or defect." The leg-
islature also should make whatever incidental amendments are
needed in the Mental Health Procedures Act to conform to the sug-
gested criteria.
There is a certain logic to the criteria of Act No. 286.14 The
definition of "mentally ill" corresponds to the Model Penal Code test
for insanity. 15 That test is more generous to defendants than Penn-
sylvania's traditional M'Naghten standard; it encompasses a broader
range of impairments including deficiencies in behavior controls. The
jury's factual finding that "mental illness" of the Model Penal Code
type existed at the time of the crime may be quite relevant to the
issues of present mental condition and dangerousness that will be the
subject of the ensuing judicial inquiry. However, because the Model
12. See Appendix B-An Apologia for Pennsylvania's Insanity Defense.
13. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§314(a), (c)(1)(1983).
14. For arguments in support of the verdict guilty but mentally ill, see Comment, Guilty
But Mentally Ill: A Reasonable Compromise for Pennsylvania, 85 DICK. L. REv. 289 (1981);
Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URBAN
L. 471 (1976).
15. MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01(1)(Proposed Official Draft 1982).
Penal Code standard is rather sophisticated and overlaps the
M'Naghten Rule, it must be carefully explained to the jury. The
primary functions of a finding of "guilty but mentally ill" are to
avoid unwarranted insanity acquittals by allowing juries to express a
conclusion that the defendant, although guilty, was impaired at the
time of the crime and to set in motion a judicial inquiry into the
accused's present condition. When these functions are considered,
the possible value of the ALI test seems to be outweighed by the
risks of confusing jurors. A simpler standard and a lesser degree of
proof should suffice for a finding of guilty but mentally ill. While
reviewing the suggested instruction, the reader might consider to
what extent the existing criteria for a verdict of guilty but mentally
ill complicate the charge.16
The Suggested Instruction
The text of the suggested charge is presented below. A subcom-
mittee note, which will appear in the Committee's manual, is re-
printed in Appendix A. The note is intended to furnish trial judges
with guidance on the use of the charge and an explanation of its
sources.
5.01A (Crim) Insanity (covers statutory amendments through Act
No. 286 (1982)).
(1) Because the defendant has asserted an insanity defense,
you will have to consider four possible verdicts. In addition to
"guilty" and "not guilty" which are available verdicts in any crimi-
nal case, you will have to think about the special alternatives of "not
guilty by reason of legal insanity" and of "guilty but mentally ill."
(If you keep in mind why the law permits these two special verdicts
it may help you understand my subsequent instructions. The verdict
of not guilty by reason of legal insanity labels a defendant as sick
rather than bad. It signifies that in the eyes of the law the person,
because of mental abnormality at the time of the crime, does not
deserve to be blamed and treated as a criminal for what he did. The
16. Judge Berel Caesar, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, predicted in a September
16, 1983 letter to the author "that ultimately Act 286-1982, in its present form, will be struck
down because it states that a person may be guilty (though mentally ill) because of a mental
state which is essentially the same as the mental state of one who is not guilty (by reason of
insanity). It defines a mental state which will support guilt (lacking substantial capacity to
appreciate wrongfulness) in essentially the same terms as the mental state which leads to non-
guilt (incapable of appreciating wrongfulness)."
The concept of giving juries the alternatives of returning verdicts of insanity or guilt with
mental illness has been variously criticized as pointless, mischievous and potentially unconsti-
tutional. See N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 83-87 (1982); Comment, Guilty
But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URBAN L. 471, 492-93
(1976).
verdict of guilty but mentally ill labels a defendant as both bad and
sick. It means that in the law's eyes that person, at the time of the
crime, was not so mentally abnormal as to be relieved from blame
and criminal punishment for what he did but that he was abnormal
enough to make him a prime candidate for special therapeutic
treatment.)
(2) Legal insanity which exists at the time of an alleged crime
is a complete defense to that crime. The defendant has the burden of
proving an insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence, that
is, by the greater weight of the evidence. If the defense is proven, the
defendant is entitled to a verdict of not guilty by reason of legal
insanity.
(3) The term insanity has a special meaning in the criminal
law. (Persons whom medical experts would diagnose as mentally dis-
ordered or whom laymen would call crazy may not be insane when
judged by the legal test.) The test or definition of legal insanity is
this: A person is legally insane if at the time of committing an al-
leged crime, he is laboring under such a defect of reason, from dis-
ease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
is doing or, if he does know the nature and quality of the act, he does
not know that what he is doing is wrong. Stated more simply, a per-
son is legally insane if at the time of committing an alleged crime he
is, as the result of mental disease or defect, either incapable of know-
ing what he is doing, or if he does know what he is doing, is incapa-
ble of judging that it is wrong. The term "mental disease or defect"
in this test means a disease of infirmity of the mind as distinguished
from a mere fault of character, temperament or social adjustment.
[(4) If you find the defendant not guilty on the ground of legal
insanity and all of you agree on that ground, your verdict should be,
"We find the defendant not guilty by reasons of legal insanity." If
you find the defendant not guilty but none of you, or only some of
you, do so on the ground of legal insanity, then your verdict should
be simply "We find the defendant not guilty."]
(5) "Guilty but mentally ill" becomes a possible verdict when
a defendant offers but fails to prove a legal insanity defense. A jury
may return such a verdict when it finds beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime alleged and that the defen-
dant, although the jury did not find him legally insane, was mentally
ill at the time of the crime.
(6) The term "mentally ill" is another term with a special
meaning. The definition or test of mental illness for our purposes is
this: A person is mentally ill if he, at the time of an alleged crime
and as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity,
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law.
[(7) Comparing the definitions of "legal insanity" and
"mental illness" we can see that they both require a mental disease
or defect which is something more than faulty character, tempera-
ment or social adjustment. Their definitions differ, however, with re-
gard to the incapacitating effect necessary for legal insanity on the
one hand or mental illness on the other. Legal insanity requires that
the defendant be incapable either of knowing what he is doing or of
judging its wrongfulness. Mental illness requires only that the defen-
dant lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness
of what he is doing or to obey the law. Loosely speaking, mental
illness is the broader term. It covers a greater range of abnormal
conditions than legal insanity. A final difference lies in the degree of
proof. Legal insanity must be proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, while mental illness must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.]
(8) In determining the questions of legal insanity and mental
illness you should consider all the relevant evidence including (the
testimony of witnesses regarding the acts, words, conversations, be-
havior and appearance of the defendant at, and close to, the time of
the alleged crime) (the testimony of the expert witnesses) (the testi-
mony of ordinary witnesses concerning the defendant's general
mental condition) ( ). The critical time when legal insanity
or mental illness must exist in order to affect the verdict is at the
time when the alleged criminal act was committed. Although you
may consider evidence of the defendant's mental condition before
and after that time you may consider it only to help you determine
his mental condition (and state of mind) at the time of the alleged
crime.
(9) In determining questions of legal insanity and guilt you
really should not concern yourself with what will happen to the de-
fendant if you find him not guilty-whether he will be set free or
whether he will be confined to a mental hospital for treatment. You
should apply the law that I give you to decide the case and assume
that, whatever your verdict, the authorities will make a wise disposi-
tion of the defendant. I will tell you, however, that when a defendant
is found not guilty by reason of legal insanity he may be subject to
an immediate court proceeding to decide whether he should be com-
mitted to a mental treatment facility. If committed, his commitment
should continue until he is no longer dangerous to others or to
himself.
(10) I will tell you also that a defendant who is found guilty
but mentally ill may be given any sentence which may lawfully be
imposed on any person convicted of the same crime. However, before
imposing sentence, the court must hold a hearing and make findings
concerning the defendant's current mental condition and need for
treatment. The law provides that a defendant who is severely men-
tally disabled and in need of treatment at the time of sentencing
shall, consistently with available resources, be furnished such treat-
ment as is psychiatrically or psychologically indicated for his mental
illness. The "Mental Health Procedures Act" dictates where and
how treatment will be provided, for example, whether in prison or in
a mental treatment facility.
(11) To sum up, you have four alternative verdicts to think
about. Two are the ordinary verdicts of "guilty" and "not guilty";
the other two are the special verdicts of "not guilty by reason of
legal insanity" and "guilty but ,mentally ill." In order to find the
defendant not guilty by reason of legal insanity you must be satisfied
by a preponderance of the evidence first, that at the time (of the
killing) (-.) the defendant had a mental disease or defect and sec-
ond, that as a result of that disease or defect the defendant was ei-
ther incapable of knowing what he was doing or, if he did know what
he was doing, was incapable of judging that it was wrong. In order
to find the defendant guilty but mentally ill you must be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt first that the defendant committed the
crime alleged, second, that, although you did not find him legally
insane, the defendant at the time of the crime had a mental disease
or defect* and third, that as a result of that disease or defect the
defendant lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law.
APPENDIX A
Subcommittee Note to Instruction 5.01A (Crim) Insanity
This instruction is appropriate for use when the defendant's san-
ity at the time of an alleged offense is an issue at trial and when 18
Pa. C.S. §§314, 315 and 42 Pa. C.S. §9727 are applicable. These
sections were added by the Act of December 15, 1982, P.L. 1262,
No. 286 (effective in 90 days); they confirm M'Naghten's rule as the
sole test for legal insanity, return the burden of proof to the defen-
dant, provide for findings of guilty but mentally ill and provide for
the disposition of persons who are found to be guilty but mentally ill.
The instruction is likely to require tailoring to the evidence and con-
tentions of the particular case. The parenthetical portions of subdivi-
sion (1) and subdivision (7) comprise optional explanatory matter
which can be eliminated to shorten the instruction. With modifica-
tions, the instruction can be used when the issue of mental responsi-
bility is tried before a separate jury in a bifurcated trial under
Mental Health Procedures Act §404c, 50 P.S. §7404(c).
Much of the evidence relevant to a sanity issue is likely to con-
sist of expert testimony. See Instructions 4.10A, 4.10B, and 4.11 for
suitable instructions on expert testimony. It may be desirable to em-
phasize in proper cases that the jurors are not bound by expert testi-
mony. They may convict or acquit, notwithstanding the opinions of
the experts, in accordance with their own evaluation of the total evi-
dence, see Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627
(1974). Over the years the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been
divided on the general reliability and value of expert testimony re-
garding sanity in criminal cases. Until rather recently, the prevailing
members of the court held such evidence in relatively low esteem, see
Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa. 190, 85 A.2d 391 (1952);
Commonwealth v. Tomlinson, 446 Pa. 241, 284 A.2d 687 (1971). A
majority of the court now looks more approvingly on psychiatric evi-
dence, see Commonwealth v. Weinstein, - Pa. -, 451 A.2d
1344 (1982); Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d
914 (1976); Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d
286 (1972).
This instruction embodies the M'Naghten right-wrong test
which has been confirmed by new Crimes Code §§ 314(d) and 315
to be the sole test for legal insanity in Pennsylvania. Previous to the
enactment of those sections, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had,
over repeated dissents, rejected other tests of full, legal insanity, in-
cluding irresistable impulse and inability to adhere to the right, see
e.g., Commonwealth v. Tomlinson, supra; Commonwealth v.
Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311, 218 A.2d 561 (1966); Commonwealth v.
Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960); Commonwealth v.
Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970); Commonwealth v. Weinstein,
442 Pa. 70, 274 A.2d 182, cert. den. 404 U.S. 846 (1971); and Com-
monwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846). New Crimes Code
§§314(d), 315 seem to refute any possible.contention that Mosler
and Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693 (1971)
currently allow a narrow homicidal mania-irresistable impulse de-
fense. In 1976, the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Walzack,
supra recognized a "diminished capacity" defense to first degree
murder and overruled prior cases, such as Tomlinson, Ahearn and
the 1971 Weinstein case to the extent that they rejected that de-
fense. It is assumed that new sections 314(d) and 315 do not over-
turn this diminished capacity defense which is in reality more a rule
admitting expert evidence than a substantive law defense.
With respect to the content of subdivision (3), the first version
of the M'Naghten test is taken from new Crimes Code §315(b)
which follows the classic language of the original M'Naghten deci-
sion. The second simpler formulation is taken largely from Wood-
house 401 Pa. at 248, 281, 164 A.2d at 102-103 and Vogel, 440 Pa.
at 10, 268 A.2d at 94. The point that legal insanity is synonymous
with neither expert nor lay notions of mental soundness is made in
Commonwealth v. Carlucetti, 369 Pa. 190, 200, 85 A.2d 391, 395
(1952) (legal versus medical); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa.
305, 311, 396 A.2d 1183, 1185-6 (1979) (insanity is more than a
layman's approximation of the degree of mental soundness necessary
to possess the requisite mental state; it is a societal judgment as to
the minimal mental capacity necessary for criminal responsibility).
The partial definition given to "mental disease or defect" in subdivi-
sion (3) is not taken from any Pennsylvania case. However, it seems
desirable that some guidance be given the jury on the significance of
the term. The definition chosen appears to be consistent with various
conditions that the Supreme Court has said do not constitute in-
sanity, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Ahearn, supra. In a proper case,
the court may wish to point out that an acute episode of voluntary
intoxication is not a mental disease or defect and hence cannot be
the basis for an insanity defense, see Commonwealth v. Hicks,
supra.
Subdivision (2) places the burden of both raising and proving
insanity on the defendant as now required by Crimes Code §315(a).
Section 315(a) overturns Commonwealth v. Demmitt, supra, which
had placed the burden of proving sanity, when questioned, upon the
Commonwealth beyond reasonable doubt. This instruction says noth-
ing about any presumption of sanity. References in a jury instruction
to the presumption are unnecessary and not very helpful, see Dem-
mitt, supra, 456 Pa. at 483, 321 A.2d at 632 (concurring opinion of
Justice Nix).
Subdivision (2) and other parts of the instruction call for the
jury to return a special verdict if it finds the defendant not guilty on
the ground of insanity even though Section 502 of the Mental
Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S. § 7502 appears to repeal the re-
quirements of special verdicts imposed by previous law (Act of Octo-
ber 20, 1966, P.L. 96, Art. IV §413, 50 P.S. §4413; Act of March
31, 1860, P.L. 427 §66 as amended, 19 P.S. §1351) except as to
persons who are mentally retarded. In the opinion of the Subcommit-
tee the purported repeal was inadvertent. Other sections of the
Mental Health Procedures Act contemplate the use of special ver-
dicts. For instance, verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity are a
predicate to an initial involuntary commitment for a period in excess
of 90 days. Mental Health Procedures Act §304(g)(1), 50 P.S.
§7304 (g)(1). See also 50 P.S. §7301(b)(1); 50 P.S. §7406. The in-
struction also reminds the jury of its option to return a general ac-
quittal. The jury must be told of this option even if the defendant
relies exclusively on the insanity defense at the trial, Commonwealth
v. Edwards, 394 Pa. 335, 147 A.2d 313 (1959).
Subdivision (9) complies with the requirement of Common-
wealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349 (1977) that, in order
to alleviate jurors' fears that a dangerously insane defendant might
be turned loose and to avert consequent unwarranted convictions, the
jury must be instructed concerning possible psychiatric treatment
and commitment of the defendant if he is acquitted on the ground of
insanity. See also Commonwealth v. McCann, 302 Pa. Super. 442,
448 A.2d 1123 (1982); Mental Health Procedures Act §§ 301, 304,
305, and 406, 50 P.S. §§ 7301, 7304, 7305, 7406.
Subdivisions (5) and (6) apprise the jury of its option of re-
turning a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. They are based on new
Crimes Code §314. The test for mental illness in Section 314 is iden-
tical to the ALI-Model Penal Code test for insanity. For commen-
tary on ALI insanity, see Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4,
156-60 (1955). If read literally, Section 314 appears to require the
jury to find beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was not in-
sane as one of the predicates to a finding of guilty but mentally ill.
The subcommittee believes that the language used in subdivision (5)
is more likely to reflect the intent of the legislature than such a lit-
eral reading. The subcommittee's language is also more favorable to
the defendant. Subdivision (10) is based on new Section 9727 of Ti-
tle 42. It acquaints the jury generally with the consequences of a
verdict of guilty but mentally ill.
Subdivision (8) points out to the jurors general kinds of evi-
dence they should consider on the issue of legal insanity and mental
illness. The instruction lumps the two issues together because much
of the evidence that is relevant to one issue will be relevant to the
other. However, the court may wish to modify this section and dis-
cuss relevance with more specificity in some situations, for example,
in a case where there is evidence of irresistable impulse relevant to
mental illness (capacity to conform conduct) but not to legal in-
sanity, cf. Commonwealth v. Weinstein, - Pa. -, 451 A.2d
1344 (1982) (a diminished capacity case).
For a lucid general treatment of all aspects of the insanity de-
fense, see A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense (1967).
APPENDIX B
An Apologia for Pennsylvania's Insanity Defense
Designing an insanity defense involves addressing problems of
justice and societal protection that should be dealt with by legisla-
tures rather than by courts. Factors that should be considered in-
clude fundamental legal concepts and principles (for example, con-
stitutional restrictions, mens rea, free will, rationale for punishment),
psychiatry's and psychology's therapeutic goals and understanding of
the human mind, and public opinion. The administrative difficulties
and costs that go along with the several approaches to the insanity
defense should also be weighed. With so many different and complex
variables to accommodate, hard questions have to be answered and
hard choices made. For instance, which of the purposes of punish-
ment should be emphasized-retribution, deterrence, incapacitation
or rehabilitation? Should inability to control behavior be a defense?
On the one hand this disability negates free will, a traditional predi-
cate for criminal responsibility, and recognizes that more than sound
intellect is involved in mental health. On the other hand it forces
expert witnesses and jurors to draw elusive distinctions between irre-
sistible and unresisted impulses and compulsions. Ultimately two
questions must be answered: What does the public really want with
respect to the acquittal and disposition of mentally impaired, possi-
bly dangerous, persons, and what due process and other strictures
does the Constitution impose?
The Pennsylvania Legislature has provided a fair and sensible
legal framework in Act No. 286 and the Mental Health Procedures
Act. The M'Naghten standard, with the burden of persuasion on the
defendant, occupies the middle ground in the current controversy
over whether the insanity defense should be abolished or expanded.
Only a relatively small number of demonstrably seriously impaired
persons can avail themselves of the defense. It is limited to the kind
of impairments-of cognition and intellectual functions-which can
be identified with some confidence by experts and jurors. Persons
who qualify for the defense, because they are incapable of knowing
what they were doing or judging its wrongfulness, are persons who
could not have been deterred by the threat of criminal sanctions. The
defense is directed at the mens rea element of crimes-an actor's
inability to know the nature and quality of his physical acts negates
the actor's awareness of his acts and their consequences, the very
essence of general criminal intent. By also excusing one who lacks
capacity to know the wrongfulness of his conduct, the Pennsylvania
defense adds an explicitly moral dimension to the mens rea require-
ment. The defense reinforces the claim that the criminal process is
more than a social tool for coping with troublesome people-a crimi-
nal conviction is the community's official condemnation of someone
who truly deserves blame and punishment. Pennsylvania's guilty but
mentally ill alternative is a humane supplement to the insanity de-
fense. It helps to identify persons whose mental problems make them
prime candidates for special treatment.
The Mental Health Procedures Act provides those persons
found not guilty by reason of insanity with procedural guidelines
similar to those that apply to involuntary civil commitments. One
exception is that the normal requirement of proving assaultive con-
duct within the previous thirty days, as an element of dangerousness,
may not apply. 17 Another exception is that orders for involuntary
commitment may be for periods of one year rather than nintey
days.18 Successive new orders have to be sought if commitments are
to continue. Compared with jurisdictions which preserve the tradi-
tion of making prolonged detention of the acquitted insane easy,
Pennsylvania treats insanity acquittals as conferring a right to free-
dom. The right can only be overcome by a civil commitment based
on current severe disability and need for treatment. The risk that
some dangerous people will be released is the price paid for investing
real meaning in the "acquittal" aspect of insanity verdicts. Quaere
whether the risk is proving excessive in practice; has the Mental
Health Procedures Act gone too far in applying rules for committing
ordinary mental patients to the acquitted insane? People who have
observed or studied the Act in operation are in a better position than
the author to answer this question.
Of course, the mere existence within a state of a sound legal
framework for dealing with the insane does not assure that justice
will be done and society protected. Those ends are not approachable
without judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, forensic experts and
mental health personnel who understand their roles in the process
and have the skill, determination and resources to play those roles
well.19
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §7301(b)(Purdon Supp. 1983).
18. Id. §7304(g).
19. See generally A.S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); N. MORRIS, MAD-
NESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards, First Tentative Draft (1983); W.K. GAYLIN, M.D., THE KILLING OF BON-
NIE GARLAND (1982); M.H. Belsky, Pennsylvania's New Mental Health Law, 48 PA. BAR Q.
482 (1977).
